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In spite of the increasing importance and expanding scope of
international law, some subjects of international law still fall outside of the
protection offered by existing legal instruments.
Under certain circumstances, stateless persons,' for example, may find
themselves in a situation akin to refugees, but due to occupation, have no
(in any case not anymore) country of their own, and not being able to cross
borders they would not qualify as persons fleeing their country of origin in
terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention2 and its 1967 Protocol. On the

*
Co-chair of the International Refugee Law Interest Group of the American Society of
International Law, currently serves at the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board. He has previously
taught at the University of Oslo and at Boston University as a Lecturer in International Law and Visiting
Fulbright Scholar. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board.

1.
See, e.g., "[A] person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation
of its law." United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force on June 6, 1960).
2.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. (1)(A), July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force on Apr. 22, 1954). The Refugee Convention defines as a person
who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country-, or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id. art. (1)(A) [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
3.
See generally United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force on Oct. 4 1967) [hereinafter Protocol for Status of Refugees].
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other hand, being confined to an occupied territory and thus being
prevented from moving, they would not fit the description of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) either.
"Climate refugees" are a special sort of migrant, akin to IDPs when
displaced within their own country due to catastrophic conditions, such as
earthquakes, tsunamis, draughts and other, more or less, natural disasters.
However, climate change, weather induced dire straits, mutatis mutandis,
knows no frontiers and hence, "climate refugees" often have to cross into
another country in order to escape from life threatening conditions. Yet,
once crossing an international border, they are no longer IDPs, but neither
are they refugees under the Refugee Convention, as "climate" today is not a
Even where the
(Refugee) Convention ground of persecution.
Convention's refugee definition applies, or where, for example, a legitimate
claim to designation as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva
Convention4 (Geneva IV) may be made, the rules governing the granting of
the respective status, its duration, and the expiration of such obligations are
at best blurry.
While all of the above groups of people may be described as "persons
to be protected," this article will have a main focus on state responsibility
for convention refugees in times of-and beyond-occupation; juxtaposing
their designation and states' post-conflict obligations with the ones
accorded to protected persons under Geneva IV as the two groups of
"persons to be protected" perhaps the most directly affected by, and
depending on, actions by foreign states.
Furthermore, while highlighting some questionable approaches on the
part of individual states towards the state responsibility issues involved,
those examples are merely illustrative of some general flaws of the current
international refugee regime. Here, it is argued that although individual
state's actions may exacerbate or alleviate the general problems involved to
a certain extent, unless those shortcomings are addressed on an
international level, the often insufficient protection offered to people in
need will persist.
Thus, this article will start with placing the current refugee and burden
sharing regime in context, followed by an assessment of state
responsibilities de lege lata. After highlighting some consequences of a
narrow reading of state obligations and critiquing the existing legal
framework, thoughts as to how to turn state responsibilities de legeferrenda

See generally The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
4.
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1950)
[hereinafter Geneva IV Convention].
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into binding legal obligations are put forward, before offering some
tentative conclusions, summarizing the main points of contention.
I. PLACING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES IN CONTEXT

The refugee regime, initially designed to cope with the aftermath of
the Second World War and hence, in the main, focusing on European
refugees fleeing from the horrors and consequences of war, nowadays is
under pressure. In the 21st century, the majority of migrants and refugees
entering Western, and especially European states, hail from distant
countries and continents, not, as was previously the norm, neighboring
states. And the total number of people, for various reasons, fleeing their
country of origin has been on the increase for a number of years.
To the extent that rational choice is an option, people seek to achieve
their goals, taking a line of least resistance. So do refugees, focusing on
entering a safe country through whatever port of entry possible, albeit
"choice" is often not an option they have.
Hence, taking Europe as an example, for geopolitical reasons,
countries in the South and Southeast of Europe, such as Greece and Italy,
are more likely to receive large numbers of refugees, mainly from African
and Asian countries, than their Northern European counterparts, as the
former often represent the closest port of entry into Europe. In an attempt
to reduce so-called "asylum-shopping"-the activity of applying multiple
times in different countries for asylum-the European Union (EU)
established the Dublin II regime. The Dublin II regime basically states that
wherever a person enters the EU with a view to seeking asylum determines
where his or her application has to be processed and decided. If it were to
be detected that a person made a second application in another EU Member
State, that person will be sent back to the country through which he initially
entered the EU. That, however, has further contributed to an unbalanced
burden-sharing status quo, with countries closest to the entry ports
receiving the highest number of asylum seekers. With an ever deteriorating
system for asylum status determination due to lack of economic resources
and perhaps also economic incentives, countries at the periphery, such as
those in the north of Europe, receive an unduly low share of the total
number of applicants entering the EU.
Furthermore, in order to control the growing number of refugees and
migrants attempting to enter Europe, Frontex, the EU's joint border patrol
force, has increased its activities in the past two years by: dispatching
patrol boats to the Aegean Sea to block arrival of mostly African illegal
immigrants by sea, and, more recently, heightening control around the
Greek town of Nea Vissa. Nea Vissa borders Turkey and has become the
main corridor for illegal entry into Europe by Middle Eastern and North
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African people seeking protection or simply a better future.' Hence, people
trying to enter the EU to explore new avenues take even greater risks in
order to literally find an opening, and sometimes their "port of entry" is
merely a rock.6 In addition, upset by the uneven distribution of burden
within the EU asylum system, countries on top of the port of entry statistics
are increasingly aiming at entering into bilateral agreements with countries
that serve as hubs on the way to Europe. As a case in point, Italy and Libya
reportedly executed an agreement that pays Libya compensation in return
for cracking down on illegal migration routes stemming from, or in any
case leading through, Libya. That agreement includes an opening for
Italian authorities to swiftly return intercepted boat migrants to Libya, a
country which is not a state party to the Refugee Convention, before they
even reach Italian shores or "rocks" that is. The agreement has been
criticized for not sufficiently differentiating between illegal migrants, and
genuine refugees, and in many instances not even having the necessary
procedures in place in order to make a well-informed decision as to the
determination of the proper refugee status of the people intercepted, before
they are returned.
In sum, contemplating state responsibility issues in the context of the
existing burden-sharing status quo, as highlighted by the EU asylum
system, the emerging picture is one of imbalance to the extent that
refugees' due process rights, including a fair hearing of individual asylum
claims, are jeopardized. The fairness of the asylum system is jeopardized
by refugee flows simply being paid-off and redirected to countries less
concerned with, and feeling less bound by, the Refugee Convention-and
the granting of rights pronounced therein. But what legal obligations
towards protecting refugees or protected persons under Geneva IV are there
today?

5.
Cf Edward Cody, Greek Town Becomes Flash Point in War against Muslim Immigrants,
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpPOST, Nov. 11,
WASHINGTON
dyn/content/article/2010/1 1/1 1/AR20101 l 107562.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
6.
Cf The small Italian island of Lampedusa, 127 miles off Sicily (and 70 miles off Tunis),
which, due to its remote location en route from North Africa to Europe, has often become the first (and
only) destination of migrants and (boat) refugees taking the sea way on their flight, risking the journey
in overcrowded and unsuitable craft, just to come to an equally overcrowded island, with few chances of
proceeding any further.
See generally Italy/Libya: Migrants Describe ForcedReturn, Abuse, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
7.
Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/09/17/italylibya-migrants-describeforced-retums-abuse (last visited Nov. I1, 2010); see also Italy to Pay Libya 5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
31,
2008,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/world/europe/31ihtitaly.4.15774385.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
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A. Responsibilitiesde lege lata: Where Are We at Today?
As far as refugees are concerned, as a point of departure a state only
has responsibilities for people crossing into its territory and applying for
refugee status after crossing the border. In fact, an asylum application
generally may not be brought unless the applicant finds himself within the
country where he wants to seek asylum, and in any case, by definition,
according to Article 1, Section A of the Refugee Convention, a refugee
needs to be "outside the country of his nationality"-otherwise he would
not qualify as a refugee. Other than that, states may also accept so-called
"quota refugees," denoting persons who have been selected and whose
refugee status has been determined by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), prior to being transferred to his or
her country of refuge. In such cases, the entire process of selection and
transfer is organized by the UNHCR, and generally referred to as
resettlement. While states pledging acceptance of a certain refugee quota
per year are bound by that statement, the pledge itself is generally
voluntary. In contrast, if found to have a well-founded fear of persecution
based on a Refugee Convention ground, accepting the refugee claim of a
person fleeing to the respective country is not optional, but a legal
responsibility for any state party to the Refugee Convention.
But, excluding acceptance of UNHCR refugee quotas, which represent
to a large extent deliberate choices, as opposed to legal obligations, where
does that leave us in terms of responsibilities de lege lata?
If the only legal responsibility of states towards refugees pertains to
those knocking at their respective frontier's doors, what does that lead to on
a global level? As previously mentioned, the EU asylum system, as well
as other regions' refugee regimes, suffers from a number of shortcomings,
due, inter alia, to the fact that some ports of entry stand out. This leaves
those countries closest to the refugee roads most travelled with, by far, the
largest share of new arrivals. Neighboring countries physically connected
to those Southern and Southeastern outer EU borders are, on average,
significantly less affected by the migrant and refugee flows. The more
towards the geographic periphery relative to the refugee flows a country is

8.
For states not party to the Refugee Convention, legal obligations based on customary law,
such as the principle of "non-refoulement" enshrined in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, but now
arguably also having reached status as customary law, may be contemplated. Accepting a person as a
refugee and conferring refugee status on that person, and merely not returning a person to the country he
or she fled from, without conferring refugee status on that person, are two quite separate issues. The
former endows the refugee with a set of rights, including eventual, and usually, permanent residency
status. The latter, on the other hand, resembles much more a fickle state of limbo, which may literally
change overnight. See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33.
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situated, the fewer, in general, 9 the number of refugee claims, simply
because it is harder and more expensive for a refugee to travel all the way.
Now, imagine Iceland. In accordance with that general pattern, the
number of refugee arrivals to Iceland each year is quite small;' 0 though, to
be fair, so is the total population of Iceland." But is that itself sufficient
ground for barely being required to deal with refugee flows? Based on
international legal requirements as of now, the answer would be yes.
Considering that Iceland is a country situated in a rather remote area, and is
neither physically connected to the European mainland nor of particular
political significance on the world stage, one might concede that Iceland
has not much of an influence on any refugee flows, and as such, should
only be required to deal with those actually coming to its borders and
applying for protection.
But what if Iceland were a military superpower (for the sake of
argument), and had been heavily involved in conflict zones overseas
negatively affecting parts of the civilian population and contributing to
refugee flows abroad-irrespective of positive goals that may have been
achieved? Would the balance of obligations then change, or would it still
be correct to assume that Iceland had no further obligations towards
refugees other than to those who manage to cross the oceans and apply for
protection in Iceland? In line with the existing legal framework, causation
does not matter and states need only confer refugee status upon qualifying
persons who apply within their borders. Even where occupation or
intervention is the main contributing factor to a refugee flow, obligations de
lege lata remain the same. People in such conflict situations often are not
able to cross borders at all, or at best manage to cross into the nearest
neighboring countries. With respect to the Iraq war, for example, states
like Jordan and Syria carry the main refugee burden, simply due to their
proximity to the conflict zone.

Of course, to the degree that there is a real element of choice involved, considerations of
9.
wealth, human rights record, etc. of the refugee's country of destination play a part in deciding where to
try to apply for refugee status, but the general, overall (geographically determined) pattern is not
significantly changed by that.
10.
Seventy-six individuals in 2008, see Zoe Roberts, Asylum Seekers in Norway: Can We
Learn from Our Ancestors' Descendants?, REYKIAVIK GRAPEVINE, July 21, 2009, available at
(last visited Nov.
http://www.grapevine.is/Features/ReadArticle/Article-Asylum-Seekers-In-Norway
11,2010).
As of July 2010, Iceland's population amounts to a mere 318,000 people. Compared to
11.
Norway, also a country at the periphery and outside the EU, Iceland is not quite as remote from the main
refugee roads. Although both are signatories to the Dublin Regulations, Norway has a population of 4.9
million inhabitants with a total number of 14,431 arrivals in 2008, or 3.1 refugee claims per 1,000
inhabitants, while Iceland has a mere 0.03 claims. Roberts, supra note 10, at 1-2.
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Furthermore, what is the state of the law with respect to state
responsibility for protected persons? According to Geneva I, "persons
protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in
the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals."1 2 "They shall at all times be humanely treated,"" not be
treated as enemy aliens,14 and "shall not be transferred to a Power which is
not a Party to the Convention." 5 Even so, the detaining power may only
transfer protected persons after it has "satisfied itself of the willingness and
ability of such transferee Power to apply the present Convention" 6 and
"[p]rotected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in
any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention" 7 as the result of any agreement concluded between the
authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power.
While Geneva IV conveys a number of rights upon protected persons,
it is less clear how far those rights extend, what specific preconditions need
to be fulfilled before protected persons may be transferred and thus their
status changed, or for what period of time a state's responsibility towards
protected persons under Geneva IV applies. For instance, while Geneva I
applies to the protection of civilian persons in times of war and defines
certain obligations of the occupying power, the wording of the above
mentioned articles does not unambiguously explain whether the rules
governing protected persons only apply during occupation. Regardless,
there seems to be room for debate as to when exactly an occupation ends,
when a formerly occupied power gains sovereignty, and when, if at all,
obligations of the former occupying power towards protected persons
expire.
Finally, in regard to persons defined as refugees, in recent years a
certain amount of debate has been revolving around questions as to when
refugee status may be revoked based on a change of circumstances in the
refugee's country of origin. In accordance with Article 1, Section C(5) of
the Refugee Convention, if circumstances in the country of origin which led
to the granting of refugee status have ceased to exist, refugee status may be
discontinued. However, while a strict interpretation may lead to a
12.

Geneva IV Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.

13.

Id. art. 27.

14.

Id. art. 44.

15.

Id. art. 45.

16.

Id.

17.

Geneva IV Convention, supra note 4, art. 47.

18.

Id.
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presumption that states' responsibility for persons to whom refugee status
has been granted may be discontinued, whenever the initial circumstances
leading to a positive refugee status determination have changed (a
definition of the durability of the required change of circumstances is
nowhere to be found). Hence, even the expiration of states' obligations
seems to be in dispute.
In sum, while state responsibilities for refugees and other protected
persons de lege lata may be narrowly construed, the less-than-clear
wording of certain provisions, and the imbalance of the current asylum
system on a global level, invite addressing the underlying more generic
questions such as: Does an occupying power carry primary responsibility
for refugees "created" by war or intervention? Is legitimacy of relevance in
that evaluation? Does an occupying power's granting of protected person
status under Geneva IV expire with the end of occupation? What
responsibilities exist with respect to ensuring the continued well-being of
people once designated as protected persons by an occupying power? And
under what particular conditions may refugee status be revoked, based on a
claim of ceased circumstances in the refugee's country of origin? Those
questions will be dealt with in the following sections, starting in reverse
order.
1. Legal Consequences: Critique of the Current Legal Framework
Taking the above depiction of the existing legal provisions pertaining
to state responsibility for protected persons during and beyond occupation
as a point of departure, the ensuing account details consequences of a
narrow reading of states' obligations-indicating where the underlying
legal framework is unclear, blurry, or incoherent.
2. Ceased Circumstances
While Sweden took up the EU Presidency, the EU found itself at a
critical juncture in regard to the creation of a Common European Asylum
System (CEAS). The Reform Treaty, expected to be ratified by all Member
States and enter into force in the course of 2010,'9 introduces a system of
integrated management of the EU's external borders, incorporates the
20
Charter of Fundamental Rights which guarantees the right to asylum, and
expands the competence of the Court of Justice of the European

See Dr. Francesco Maiani & Dr. Vigdis Vevstad, Reflection Note on the Evaluation of the
19.
Dublin System and on the Dublin III Proposal, EUR. PARL. DoC. PE 410.690 (Mar. 2009).
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EC) 2000/C 364/01 of
20.
December 18, 2000, art. 18, 2000 O.J. (C 364/01).
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Communities (ECJ) with a view to questions of asylum and immigration. 2'
In that context, a recent request by the German Federal Administrative
Court for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ, with respect to the interpretation
of an article of a European Council Directive,22 gains importance as the
outcome would not only have significance for all EU Member States, but
the subject matter highlights a problem of global reach and contention.
The provision in question, Article 11, Section (1)(e) of Council
Directive 2004/83/EC of April 29, 2004, concerns the cessation of refugee
status because the circumstances in connection with which he or she has
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, a stipulation commonly
referred to as the "ceased circumstances" clause. Article 11, Section (1)(e)
of said Directive is based on Article 1, Section (C)(5) of the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,23 which therefore would be
of relevance in the present case. According to Article 1, Section (A)(2) of
the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 24 a refugee is a person who
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ...
."25 The special protection thus conferred to a person defined as a refugee
shall cease to apply if:
[h]e can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the
country of his nationality; ... this ... shall not apply to a refuge .
. . who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of

21.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007,2007 OJ (C 306).
22.
On April 28, 2008 the German Federal Administrative Court submitted five identical
references for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Communities concerning the
interpretation of said Article I l(1)(e) in the following cases: Case C-175/08, Aydin Salahadin Abdullah
v. Fed. Republic of Germany; Case C-176/08, Kamil Hasan v. Fed. Republic of Germany; Case C177/08, Khoshnaw Abdullah v. Fed. Republic of Germany; Case C-178/08, Ahmed Adem and Hamrin
Mosa Rashi v. Fed. Republic of Germany; Case C-179/08, Dier Jamal v. Fed. Republic of Germany,
Court Proceedings (EC) OJ (C 197) of Aug. 2, 2008, 3-5, available at http//eur(last
lex.europa.eu/JOlndex.do?year-2008&serie=C&textfield2=197&Submit-Search&ihmlang-en
visited Feb. 4, 2011).
23.

See generallyRefugee Convention, supra note 2.

24.

See generally Protocol for Status of Refugees, supra note 3.

25.

Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(A)(2).
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previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the
protection of the country of nationality.26
Based on a narrow reading of this provision, in recent years a number
of countries, including Germany, have started returning refugees, especially
from Iraq, to their country of nationality, asserting that circumstances have
sufficiently changed to justify their return. In reviewing refugee status and
interpreting the criteria for cessation, the German authorities have focused
on whether the individual concerned, at the time of the review, faced a risk
of persecution in the country of origin, either in the form of continuation of
27
In order to justify
the previous danger of persecution or a new risk.
returning refugees, UNHCR Cessation Guidelines require a change in
circumstances to be:
1)
2)
3)

Fundamental;
Durable; and
To result in effective protection being available in the
country of origin.28

However, for change to be accepted as fundamental, in the case of
persecution by a State, German courts regarded it as sufficient that the
persecuting regime had lost power. In regard to durability of change, the
only relevant question was whether the former regime was likely to regain
power. Instability resulting from military intervention was considered
irrelevant insofar as there was no likelihood of the return of the previous
regime,29 and the availability of effective protection and general issues of
safety, other than the likelihood of renewed persecution, had not been taken
into account at all.
Thus, neither widespread insecurity, precarious living conditions, nor
the only transitional character of the occupation of Iraq by the multinational
forces were considered as relevant arguments against cessation. In practice,
this approach resulted in the systematic revocation of refugee status,
especially of Iraqis who had fled the regime of Saddam Hussein. However,
26.

Id. art. 1(C)(5).

27. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerwG] [Highest Administrative Court] Nov. 1, 2005, 124
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 276.(F.R.G.). See also UNHCR, Statement
on the "Ceased Circumstances" Clause of the EC Qualification Directive (Aug. 2008), at 9 n.49,
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/48a2f2a42.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter EC
Qualification Directive].
28. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under
Article 1(C)(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased
Circumstances" Clause), Feb. 10, 2003, HCR/GIP/03/03.
29.

See, e.g., EC Qualification Directive, supra note 27, at 9 n.49.
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in view of the highly volatile security situation in Iraq, invoking the "ceased
circumstances" clause in regard to refugees originating from that country
would seem premature as, in the opinion of the UNHCR, the current
conditions on the ground have neither fundamentally or durably changednor may availability of effective protection be reduced to protection against
a recurring risk of persecution.3 o
Recognition of refugee status leading to international protection entails
protection against return to a country where the threat of persecution
persists, as enshrined in the principle of non-refoulement,3 ' but also
includes protection allowing for a life of dignity in the host State. 32 The
overarching objective of international protection is "to provide the refugee
with a durable solution in addition to and beyond safety from
persecution."3 3 This aspect has to be taken into account when the "mirror
image" of the decision to grant refugee status is considered. If the ECJ had
subscribed to such a reading of the "ceased circumstances" clause in its
ruling, revocation of refugee status throughout the EU and beyond, not least
in regards to refugees from a still fragile, occupied country, would likely
have been reversed in numerous cases, 34 based on the principle of nonrefoulement. In fact, the ECJ seems to have followed a middle course in its
Grand Chamber Judgment of March 2, 201 0.35 The Judgment did not go as
far as the UNHCR in stressing refugees' right to a durable solution beyond
safety from persecution, but dismissed the idea of revoking refugee status
solely on the basis of a finding that refugees' initial fear of persecution no
longer exists, without examining additional conditions relating to the
political situation in their country of origin. More specifically, the Court
held that the competent authorities of the respective Member State have to
"verify that there are no other circumstances which could justify a fear of

30.

EC Qualification Directive, supra note 27, at 11-12.

See Council Directive 2004/83, art. 21, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Council
31.
Directive 2004/83]; Refugee Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-34.
See Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 31, arts. 20, 22-34; Refugee Convention, supra
32.
note 2, arts. 3-34.
33.

EC Qualification Directive, supra note 27, at 15.

In Germany alone, a review may apply to up to 14,495 Iraqi refugees whose status had
34.
been revoked between November 2003 and May 2007, based on the authorities' considerations that the
dangers prevailing in Iraq were general dangers threatening the entire population and, as a general rule,
could not be equated with persecution (i.e., with the singling out of a particular person based on that
person's specific characteristics or affiliations). As to the number of potentially affected persons, see
EC Qualification Directive, supra note 27, at 5 n.28, 10 n.53.
See generally Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-175/08; C35.
176/08; C-178/08 & C-179/08, European Court of Justice, Mar. 2, 2010, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b8e6ea22.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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persecution on the part of the person concerned either for the same reason
as that initially at issue or for one of the other reasons set out in Article 2(c)
of the Directive."3 Furthermore, such:
verification means that the competent authorities must assess, in
particular, the conditions of operation of, on the one hand, the
institutions, authorities and security forces and, on the other, all
groups or bodies of the third country which may, by their action
or inaction, be responsible for acts of persecution 3aainst the
recipient of refugee status if he returns to that country.
While the ECJ ultimately (and perhaps necessarily) still leaves a
significant margin of appreciation in the hands of national authorities, it
strengthens ramifications of the refugee protection regime by more
rigorously defining the framework for cessation assessments, and the
conditions to be met, if refugee status is to be revoked based on "ceased
circumstances" in the country of origin. Thus, revocation of refugee status
may be expected to be reversed in numerous cases, and even those that are
not reversed may still qualify for subsidiary protection status, or in any case
may not be returned, based on the principle of non-refoulement. That,
however, would constitute a much weaker legal position for the persons
affected, without the prospects of access to a broad set of rights and
permanent residency as the embodiment of a durable solution.
3. Primary Responsibility
Another important and related aspect concerns the general question of
who bears primary responsibility for refugees in any given situation. The
Refugee Convention obliges all States Parties to cooperate with the
UNHCR in fulfilling its function of supervising the application of the
It also prohibits the expulsion or
provisions of the Convention."
"refoulement" of a refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened." 4 0 The Refugee
Convention itself is silent in regard to distributing the burden of accepting

36.

Id. 191.

37.

Id. 171.

38.

Cf supra note 8.

39.

See Refugee Convention, supranote 2, art. 35.

40.

See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(1).
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refugees, which is why, as-a point of departure, neighboring states usually
are still left with the main burden of dealing with refugee crises. 4 1
Looking at the Iraqi situation, neither the United States, nor Iraq, are
even States Parties to the Refugee Convention, though the United States is
a State Party to the 1967 Protocol. Furthermore, applicability of the
provisions of the Refugee Convention could be based on customary
international law. But even so, no particular legal obligation to accept a
certain number of refugees may be inferred from those international rules.
Yet, it seems intuitively wrong that of all Iraqi citizens claiming asylum in
2007, half of those claims were made in a small country like Sweden,
where "Sodertalje, a city of 83,000 people, took in more Iraqis than the
United States and Canada combined." 4 In acknowledging heightened
responsibility for refugees stemming from Iraq, especially in regard to
Iraqis that cooperated with the United States and because of this
cooperation have been exposed to reprisals by insurgents, in 2007, the
United States sought to adopt new legislation, the so-called Kennedy Bill.
The Kennedy Bill 4 3 would increase the total intake of Iraqi refugees to the
United States and, among other things, grant preferential status to Iraqi
interpreters and translators seeking resettlement in the United States."
But a more general claim may be made that an occupying country
always carries primary responsibility for the protection of those who where:
specifically affected by the occupying power's actions; refugees created by
war or intervention, irrespective of the legitimacy of those acts; and people
who would not have been refugees were it not for preceding actions of
intervening forces. Apart from a potentially increased refugee basis, that is
the "surplus" compared to the number of individuals who regardless of
outside intervention would have been refugees at a relevant juncture, such
state responsibility would all the more apply in regard to those targeted
because of their direct work for the occupying powers or indirect

Jordan and Syria, for example, currently combine to host approximately two million Iraqi
41.
refugees, while Western countries accepted only a fraction of that number.
See "Little Baghdad" Thrives in Sweden: Sodertalje Has Taken in More Iraqis Than the
42.
U.S., but Mood is Changing, MSNBC, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/25004140/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
43.

Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, S. 1651, 100th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Refugee Crisis in Iraq

Act].
See id. §5. See also Interview with Ambassador James Foley, Senior Coordinator on Iraqi
44.
& Tony Edson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, & Lori
Issues,
Refugee
Scialabba, The Department of Homeland Security's Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Iraqi Refugee
Issues, Briefing on Development in the Iraqi Refugee and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Admissions
Programs, U.S. Dep't. of State, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4, 2008), http://20012009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/100030.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
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cooperation. Despite the potential adoption of the Kennedy Bill, the duty
currently constitutes merely of a moral obligation, not a legal responsibility
akin to a guarantor's obligation-though it may be time to reconsider that
stance.45
A final matter of concern meriting further scrutiny relates to the
question of honoring previous obligations in the process of transition from
occupation to sovereignty. A point in case pertains to the People's
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), an Iranian opposition group based
in Ashraf City, Iraq. Neutral during the 2003 Iraq War, the group's
members had been designated as protected persons under the Fourth
Geneva Convention by the U.S. forces and reportedly provided assistance
to counter-terrorism efforts, and intelligence, exposing Iran's nuclear
program. The Iraqi government, however, while still in negotiations with
the United States with respect to the expiration of the UN mandate of the
multinational forces in Iraq,46 indicated it would claim control over Ashraf
and threatened to expulse the inhabitants, even to their country of origin
where serious reprisals, including torture and death penalties, would await
them.47
After concluding the U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement,4 8
basically handing over responsibility for security in "Iraqi cities, villages,
and localities" to Iraq by June 30, 2009,49 the Iraqi government did not
waste much time carrying out that threat. On July 28, 2009 Iraqi security
forces raided the PMOI camp in Ashraf, assaulting the unarmed Iranian
dissidents inside, wounding several hundred and killing at least seven.o
Despite retaining 50,000 troops in Iraq, the attack showed that the U.S.

45.

See generally Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, supra note 43.

46.

S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (expiring Dec. 31, 2008).

A decision of the Council of Ministers dated June 17, 2008 stressed that control of the
47.
PMOI should be handed over to the Iraqi government and repeated declarations by Iraqi officials echoed
that claim: Cf International Federation for Human Rights, Call on the Iraqi Authorities and the USA
(Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=printdoc&amp;docid=
48d8da4bc (last visited Feb.7, 2011).
48. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/policy/dod/iraq-sofa.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
49.

Id. art. 24(2).

50. See, e.g., Iran, "Exiles Killed in Iraq Raid", BBC NEWS, July 29, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/8175171.stm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); "L"armde irakienne
prend d'assaut le camp des Moudjahidine du peuple", LE MONDE, July 28, 2009, available at
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forces were either unable or unwilling (based on their new mandate as well
as considerations of convenience) to interfere and prevent the assaultmainly monitoring the situation. Questions remain, however, as to the
justifiability of the underlying transfer of responsibility.
The PMOI were granted status as protected persons under Geneva IV
by the U.S. forces in 2004 after lengthy procedures concluded that no
evidence had been found that any of the Ashraf residents had been involved
in prosecutable offenses. Hence, from that time onward, these residents
were under the protection of the United States, as the occupying power, and
any transfer back to the country under occupation, Iraq, would be
preconditioned on living up to the provisions of Article 45, Geneva IV.
Among the most central requirements of that legal rule are that the power to
which protected persons are transferred to is a party to the relevant Geneva
Convention, and that the transferor state, the occupying power or detaining
power, "satisfied itself of the willingness and ability" of the transferee
power, the previously occupied power." Once transfer has taken place,
responsibility for the application of the present Fourth Geneva Convention
rests on the accepting power, the transferee or previously occupied power,
while the protected persons are in its custody, and as such an occupying
power might make a claim of exoneration for whatever may happen to
protected persons after the transfer.
However, Article 45, Geneva IV, further requires that if the transferee
power "fails to carry out the provisions of the present Convention in any
important respect," a condition the killings undoubtedly fulfill, the
occupying power shall "take effective measures to correct the situation or
shall request the return of the protected persons. Such request must be
complied with."5 To be sure, Article 45 preconditions that request upon
the occupying power "being so notified by the Protecting Power," the
transferee power, which only adds to the confusion of that legal provision.
However, a teleological reading of Article 45 seems to suggest that the
notification aspect must be regarded as being of subordinate importance.
Otherwise, if, as in the above example, the abuser would be required to
notify another power of its abuse, before that power may "take effective
measures to correct the situation or request the return of the protected
persons,"the provision would appear devoid of meaning.
Irrespective of the underlying political skirmishes and interference on
the part of Iran (the current Shiite dominated Iraqi government maintains
strong ties with Shiite-led Iran) that might have triggered the attacks on
Ashraf, there is a more general question. That question is whether, or to
51.

Geneva IV Convention, supranote 4, art. 45.

52.
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what degree (based on the same reasoning applied in regard to refugees
"created" by conflict), an occupying power is under a special obligation to
ensure the continued protection of those people, once designated as
protected persons, or whether such state responsibility to protect on the part
of an occupier simply expires, if transferred to the occupied state once that
state assumes sovereignty, without the initial designator being under a
continued duty to ensure the well-being of the protected persons?
Furthermore, could such designation as protected persons, under the
Geneva Conventions, be regarded as akin to the granting of refugee status
in the sense that allowing the status of protected persons to be reneged, and
the individuals concerned sent back to the country they fled, amounting to
"refoulement," which would be contrary to international legal provisions
(such as Article 33 of the Refugee Convention)?
B. De Lege Ferrenda: From Moral to Legal Obligation
As has been outlined above, a country is, as a point of departure, only
responsible for those refugees actually crossing its borders and applying for
refugee status from within that country's territory, unless it also has made
voluntary pledges to the UNHCR of accepting transfer refugees. There is
no causation requirement included in the Refugee Convention, or other
applicable international law. However, if we agree, bearing in mind the
Iceland example for the sake of argument, that basing responsibility for
refugees merely on geographical proximity, is insufficient, and if we accept
further that disregarding the causal element entirely seems equally
intuitively wrong, how could we work towards incorporating an increased
sense of legally binding burden sharing into the existing legal framework?
While intervention and occupation sometimes may be a necessity, at times
even internationally called for, it is my contention that, irrespective of the
legitimacy of those acts and the good it may do for others, there will always
be people who would not have been refugees were it not for preceding
actions of intervening forces. And, at the very least with respect to those
refugees "created" by war or intervention, the "surplus" refugee basis
compared to the number of individuals who, at the relevant juncture,
anyways would have been refugees for various (internal) reasons and
regardless of outside intervention, a general claim may be made to primary
responsibility of the occupying power.
Assuming certain heightened, primary responsibility of the intervening
power, in any case for the protection of people whose lives were
particularly negatively affected by the intervention, for example, due to
their cooperation with the occupying forces, how could we turn such
responsibility into a legal obligation?
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One plan of action towards solving the issue of responsibility for
protected persons would be to require the occupying power to ensure full
acceptance (i.e., both willingness and ability) of the transferee in regard to
offering continued protection of persons designated as such under Geneva
IV by the occupying power, prior to the transfer of power and prior to the
regaining of full sovereignty of the formerly occupied power. Such an
acceptance could be written into the terms of the sovereignty transfer prior
to withdrawal of the occupying power. To a certain extent, Germany's
regaining of sovereignty after the Second World War was also conditional
on the acceptance and fulfillment of a number of predefined goals,
including writing and adopting a new constitution, the creation of
democratic institutions, mutatis mutandis. To be sure, the German situation
was one of debellatio,s3 which does not occur very often, and is probably
even less frequently desirable. Some situations are, however, comparable
to a certain extent, and may be regarded as akin to the German scenario at
the end of the war to the degree that sovereignty transfer is concerned. In
that sense, also Iraq would have to qualify for such a plan of action, even
though in most other regards it would be distinguishable from Germany in
1945.
Even where debellatio and hence loss and (re)transfer of sovereignty
on an absolute level is not at issue, such commitment on behalf of the
transferee state could be written into Status of Forces Agreements or similar
bilateral treaties between occupying forces and occupied powers. However,
both of the above scenarios would place the main burden on the transferee
state and hence, would not in any significant way contribute towards the
occupying power's heightened, primary responsibility.
But what if UN assistance, if not outright backing, with respect to
(humanitarian) intervention or consequences of occupation (whether the
intervention or occupation in question was justified or not),54 could be
preconditioned on prior acceptance of primary responsibility for (extra)
In other words, the complete subjugation of a belligerent nation usually involving loss of
53.
sovereignty. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/debellatio (last
visited Apr. 11, 2011).
In that regard, also, the UN's eventually more pragmatic approach in Iraq, where the UN
54.
first felt sidelined, if not outright beguiled and thus kept a distance, trying to improve the dire situation
and contribute, inter alia, to the rebuilding process, even though this was not "their" intervention to
begin with. The UN, for example, only at a significantly later juncture eventually collaborated with the
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish the
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), which was to decide upon the guidelines for the then
forthcoming elections to the National Assembly. See Tom Syring, Fata Morgana and the Lure of
Law-Rebuilding a War-torn State after Regime Breakdown: Prospects, Limits, and Illusions, in
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refugee flows that may be expected, i.e., on the prior pledge and provision
of extra means with respect to the aforementioned "surplus" refugees that
almost certainly accompany any intervention. While not being able (and
neither required) to predict the exact number of refugees, or especially
targeted persons, originating from a given conflict, nowadays no one may
claim that extra refugee flows come unexpected in situations of armed
conflict. Such acceptance could take the form of an agreement under UN
auspices, for example, concluded with the UNHCR, where acceptance of a
certain number of extra resettlements could be established-prior to any
military action. To be sure, such a requirement may lead to greater
reluctance with respect to intervening individually (as opposed to not only
UN supported, but UN backed, or Chapter VII action), but would that
necessarily be a bad thing? Considering that military intervention planning
and accounting includes invoices for everything from drones and tanks to
troops and fuel, it is about time that refugees become part of the equation
detailing the costs of armed conflict.
C. Conclusions
The existing legal framework pertaining to state responsibility for
protected persons in times of occupation and beyond is neither conclusive,
nor balanced, and hence, in need of further clarification, if not revision.
Greater efforts at burden-sharing, within regions and on a global level, in
regard to addressing and dealing with the flow of refugees are mandatory.
Burden-sharing will help alleviate the pressure on countries with the most
exposed ports of entry without jeopardizing refugees' rights to a fair
hearing of their claims to protection.
On the other hand, there seems to be a danger that the "mirror image"
of granting refugee status, i.e., revoking the special protection conferred on
a person once defined as a refugee under the "ceased circumstances"
clause, too swiftly, may be used as a means of returning refugees to their
country of origin. Closely following the legal developments in the ECJ,
other courts of law, and the practice of states will be decisive for a wellbalanced approach to limiting and ultimately revoking claims to protection.
Furthermore, as highlighted by the discussion of the PMOI case,
Article 45, Geneva IV, represents a prime example of an incoherent, if not
It also points to a potential inherent
inconclusive, legal provision.
consequence of an occupying power (unwittingly or not) contributing to
acts of refoulement on the part of the transferee state. If, by letting an
occupied state regain sovereignty, which that state abuses by treating those
who previously enjoyed protected persons status as enemies, with or
without actually threatening to expulse them to a third country where they
would have to fear persecution, the designator state, the former occupying
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power, indirectly contributes to a well-founded fear of persecution. The
designator state, therefore, could be required to grant refugee status to
those persons, as their situation then would not be any different from those
of refugees.
Finally, especially with respect to what has been denoted as "surplus"
refugees, where legal obligations akin to the ones stemming from the
Refugee Convention are largely lacking, a greater sense of legal
responsibility assumption or "Verantwortlichmachung"5 5 is needed. While
reluctance in that regard on the part of states is to be expected, it has been
argued here that moral obligations may be turned into legal obligations, if
political will and legal creativity are present.
Obviously, there are no easy answers to either the question concerning
the "ceased circumstances" clause before the ECJ, or in regard to the
allocation of primary state responsibility for refugees and other protected
persons.. The problem with both is that the issues involved pit numerous
legitimate concerns against each other. "Ceased circumstances" deals with
the extent and duration of an individual refugee's right to protection and a
life of dignity versus a state's limited resources in accommodating persons
in dire straits. The question of state responsibility pertains not only to
heightened moral, if not legal, obligations associated with occupation, but
also touches more generally on the limits of such responsibilities. When
does an occupation end and complete sovereignty of the occupied state
begin? When and under which circumstances may an occupying power
dispose of its responsibilities to protect those placed in a precarious
predicament, due to the occupying power's actions, or designated as
protected persons under the Geneva Conventions? How do we balance
legitimate assertions of sovereignty on the part of a previously occupied
state with concerns for the durable safeguarding of refugees and protected
persons under international law?
While days of occupation may be exceptional times, it is all the more
important to ensure that those ultimately and permanently endangered by
the actions of occupying powers receive protection under international law
that outlasts the occupational regime.
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